
Scholars argued that China’s actions in connection with COVID-19 (and the novel SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus), especially with the responsibilities of timing and information communication set out in Articles 6 and 7, violated the International Health Regulations (see, for example, here and here).
If China had fulfilled these commitments, today’s case of COVID-19 would possibly be exponentially less. This leads another scholar to declare, “China can and must be sued for the massive losses it has caused to the world, and to alert China of the arrival of the lawyers. Nevertheless, all these authors all share one thing: they do not recognize a legal precedent to hold China responsible for these infringements by a foreign court or tribunal.
In compliance with Article 56 of the International Health Legislation, at least two researchers have pointed out a conflict resolution mechanism (see here and here), but that mechanism does so only if China accepts that it is of course, very improbable.
Legal History
However, there is an authority overlooked: Article 75 of the Constitution of the WHO. Article 75 provides: any issues or disputes pertaining to or not addressed in talks or the health assembly on the interpretation or implementation of this Constitution, shall be referred to the ICC…
In fact, the Court itself accepted that the Court’s authority (Armed Practices, Jurisprudence and Admissibility), Decision, paragraphs of Article 75 of the WHO Constitution. [10]. Moreover, if the Court viewed Article 75 as Article 22 of the CERD (Ukraine v. Russia, preliminary objections, decision, para 113), then a State does not proceed to the World Health Assembly until the State meets the negotiating requirements so that it may sue China before the Court.
The harder question is how does a State frame its argument about Chinese actions as an interpreter or application of the WHO Constitution? It does not seem that the WHO Constitution includes significant responsibilities under the international health law. Rather the key consideration is as the name implies, the creation of a legislative system, which discusses concerns such as membership and institutional structure.
Much of this, though, appears to be a few arguments that the state might actually lodge a state in China over the reading or implementation of the WHO Constitution. I still have not formed any definite opinions on the validity of these statements, but I am very welcome to study, criticize and/or supplement the readers (especially any WHO experts out there in the comments below.
The WHO Constitution allows for future argumentsFirst, a State can attempt, by means of Articles 21 and 22 of the WHO Constitution, to demand breaches of International Health Regulation. Article 21 allows for the introduction by the World Health Assembly of legislation such as the International Health Regulations and Article 22 provides that [r]egulations approved under Article 21 will enter into effect with proper notice for all Members.
It may also be claimed that the suspected breaches by China of the International Health Regulation, in the light of articles 21 and 22, contribute to the interpretation or implementation of the WHO Constitution. However, the counter-argument was that Articles 21 and 22 only involve the authority to enact legislation and the procedure for the entry into force of the regulations, not Member States' legal duty to comply with such regulations.
A country can also argue that China breached Article 64 of the WHO Constitution, which stipulates, 'Every Member must report in an arrangement to be formed by the Assembly on statistical and epidemiological data.' According to Article 64 of the health assembly, figures should be prepared in compliance with the Nomenclature Regulations (Nomenclature Regulations, art. 6)
However, it may also be claimed that at least some provisions of the IHR, including Articles 6 and 7, relate to the determination of the way in which statistical and epidemiological data are to be issued. The Health Assembly also adopted the IHR. Article 6(2) includes, for example, State Parties to provide WHO with immediate, specific, and adequately comprehensive information on public health which may constitute an incident of international concern (PHEIC)...
Including... number of cases and deaths where appropriate. Article 7 is also wider and allows States Parties to provide WHO with any necessary information on public health, given they have proof of an incident that could constitute PHEIC. Provided this a State may possibly argue, in violation of Articles 6 and 7 of the International Health Laws, that China has contravened Article 64 of the WHO Constitution.
Another alternative is to argue a violation of Article 63, which specifies that each Member shall immediately transfer significant legislation, rules, official records, and health statistics released in that State to the Association. The argument does not apply to the communication of policy or laws, but to the communication of official records and statistics.
How the term written in this sense will be described is unknown. Firstly, it should be assumed that it applies only to freely accessible official government publications. On the other hand, Chinese doctors should for the purposes of Article 63, also consider posts in social media censored by China as to be published.
A fourth law that China may have infringed on is Article 37 which sets out in its relevant parts: each member of the Organisation... commits itself to respect, and not attempting to control, the WHO] director-general and WHO] staff, solely in their foreign character.
Here it is clearly important to note that States are still seeking through letters, meetings, and the like to manipulate members of intergovernmental organizations. Thus any intention to manipulate would not be a breach of Article 37. It would not be credible. However, it may be claimed that measures to manipulate a breach of other international law clauses such as the International Health Legislation by themselves would constitute an unconstitutional influence for the purposes of Article 37.
Finally, it would be possible for a State to consider depending on the duty under the general international law not to defeat the aim and intent of a Treaty (see Article 18 of the VCLT), arguing that China defeat the purpose of the WHO Constitution that would if equated to the WHO goal, be to ensure the highest possible standard of health for all citizens (WHO Constitution, art. 1). This argument may theoretically contain all the above claims, and those related to the blocking of COVID-19 meetings at the United Nations Security Council. It must be reminded now that the Court claimed that a competence provision such as Article 75 of the Constitution on the WHO could not protect a claim under general international law based on this duty (Military and Paramilitary Activities, Merits, Judgment, para. 271).
But one could attempt to challenge, by recalling that Article 75 does not only grant authority over any disagreement but also over any issue pertaining to the meaning or operation of the WHO Constitution, the continued validity of this 34-year old dicta.
Conclusion
Again my views on the merits of these arguments have not been conclusive. If there was merit, a state willing to prosecute China before the International Court of Justice would also have to be found, something that, of course, is not a simple feat. But even though the legal issue fails, it could also lead to major political wins by trying an argument in public fora such as the International Court of Justice.
It is not every day that foreign law abuses are reportedly blamed for the deaths of so many civilians in so many countries. So it would definitely be if there were any cases where justice needs to be served.
First, a State can attempt, by means of Articles 21 and 22 of the WHO Constitution, to demand breaches of International Health Regulation. Article 21 allows for the introduction by the World Health Assembly of legislation such as the International Health Regulations and Article 22 provides that [r]egulations approved under Article 21 will enter into effect with proper notice for all Members.
It may also be claimed that the suspected breaches by China of the International Health Regulation, in the light of articles 21 and 22, contribute to the interpretation or implementation of the WHO Constitution. However, the counter-argument was that Articles 21 and 22 only involve the authority to enact legislation and the procedure for the entry into force of the regulations, not Member States' legal duty to comply with such regulations.
A country can also argue that China breached Article 64 of the WHO Constitution, which stipulates, 'Every Member must report in an arrangement to be formed by the Assembly on statistical and epidemiological data.' According to Article 64 of the health assembly, figures should be prepared in compliance with the Nomenclature Regulations (Nomenclature Regulations, art. 6)
However, it may also be claimed that at least some provisions of the IHR, including Articles 6 and 7, relate to the determination of the way in which statistical and epidemiological data are to be issued. The Health Assembly also adopted the IHR. Article 6(2) includes, for example, State Parties to provide WHO with immediate, specific, and adequately comprehensive information on public health which may constitute an incident of international concern (PHEIC)...
Including... number of cases and deaths where appropriate. Article 7 is also wider and allows States Parties to provide WHO with any necessary information on public health, given they have proof of an incident that could constitute PHEIC. Provided this a State may possibly argue, in violation of Articles 6 and 7 of the International Health Laws, that China has contravened Article 64 of the WHO Constitution.
Another alternative is to argue a violation of Article 63, which specifies that each Member shall immediately transfer significant legislation, rules, official records, and health statistics released in that State to the Association. The argument does not apply to the communication of policy or laws, but to the communication of official records and statistics.
How the term written in this sense will be described is unknown. Firstly, it should be assumed that it applies only to freely accessible official government publications. On the other hand, Chinese doctors should for the purposes of Article 63, also consider posts in social media censored by China as to be published.
A fourth law that China may have infringed on is Article 37 which sets out in its relevant parts: each member of the Organisation... commits itself to respect, and not attempting to control, the WHO] director-general and WHO] staff, solely in their foreign character.
Here it is clearly important to note that States are still seeking through letters, meetings, and the like to manipulate members of intergovernmental organizations. Thus any intention to manipulate would not be a breach of Article 37. It would not be credible. However, it may be claimed that measures to manipulate a breach of other international law clauses such as the International Health Legislation by themselves would constitute an unconstitutional influence for the purposes of Article 37.
Finally, it would be possible for a State to consider depending on the duty under the general international law not to defeat the aim and intent of a Treaty (see Article 18 of the VCLT), arguing that China defeat the purpose of the WHO Constitution that would if equated to the WHO goal, be to ensure the highest possible standard of health for all citizens (WHO Constitution, art. 1). This argument may theoretically contain all the above claims, and those related to the blocking of COVID-19 meetings at the United Nations Security Council. It must be reminded now that the Court claimed that a competence provision such as Article 75 of the Constitution on the WHO could not protect a claim under general international law based on this duty (Military and Paramilitary Activities, Merits, Judgment, para. 271).
But one could attempt to challenge, by recalling that Article 75 does not only grant authority over any disagreement but also over any issue pertaining to the meaning or operation of the WHO Constitution, the continued validity of this 34-year old dicta.
Conclusion
Again my views on the merits of these arguments have not been conclusive. If there was merit, a state willing to prosecute China before the International Court of Justice would also have to be found, something that, of course, is not a simple feat. But even though the legal issue fails, it could also lead to major political wins by trying an argument in public fora such as the International Court of Justice.
It is not every day that foreign law abuses are reportedly blamed for the deaths of so many civilians in so many countries. So it would definitely be if there were any cases where justice needs to be served.